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Trans-Pacific Partnership
Issue 52 of Social Science Japan newsletter features articles on the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) by seven scholars in the field and comes out at a propitious
time. As Japan and the United States continue negotiations in the 12-nation TPP
talks, the articles clarify and deepen our understanding of what is at stake and
what is changing in global trade governance in this era of mega-Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs).
Nakagawa Junji points to the fragmentation of global trade governance and its
roots in the changing power structure of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the proliferation of FTAs. He suggests that the TPP may hold the key to
revitalizing the WTO, which, in turn, can better manage the globalization of
value chains. Deborah Elms illuminates the complicated and challenging path
towards gaining Congressional support and approval for the TPP in the United
States. Meredith Kolsky Lewis explains how new mega-FTAs, like TPP and the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), differ from existing
FTAs. She argues that these new formations have far-reaching implications not
only for the negotiating parties but also for the global trading community as a
whole, including developing countries. Chin Leng Lim analyzes China’s inter-
ests in the TPP and shows that different trade talks and developments affect one
another in a dialectical process that shapes the future of the Asian-Pacific trade.
Furthering a domestic analysis of the effects of free trade agreements, Sugawara
Junichi discusses how the TPP that Japan is currently negotiating differs from
Japan’s previously ratified FTAs. He sketches out the implications of the TPP for
Japan. Yamashita Kazuhito argues that while Japanese price supports and tariffs
keep domestic prices for certain agricultural products artificially high, they under-
mine Japan’s role in TPP talks and hurt the development of Japan’s agriculture.
He focuses especially on the role the Japan Agricultural Cooperative (JA) plays in
influencing agricultural interests and policies. Kuno Arata sheds light on the often
overlooked topic of transaction costs for firms that use FTAs and the post-ratifica-
tion need to promote FTAs through the creation of user-friendly environments.
For the ISS Research Report, Sato Hiroki addresses the issue of balancing caregiving
and work and how companies can help employees prepare to balance the two.
The section on the ISS Contemporary Japan Group introduces recent talks on
Japan in the seminar series. We are pleased to share information on recently pub-
lished books by ISS staff. Focus on ISS by Ishikawa Maki and Mitani Meiko is the
third in a series of reports that introduce the special collections at the ISS library.
Managing Editor, Ikeda Yoko
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In the early 21st century, the relationship between
multilateralism and regionalism in the gover-
nance of global trade has entered a new phase.
On the one hand, the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA), the first multilateral trade negotiation
under the World Trade Organization (WTO), has
been in a stalemate for a long time. On the other
hand, major trading countries in the world have
shifted their trade policy priority to the negotia-
tion of free trade agreements (FTAs). The com-
bined outcome of these two phenomena is the
increasing fragmentation of global trade gover-
nance. This article analyzes the background of
these two phenomena and explores the possibility
of curbing the fragmentation of global trade gov-
ernance through the negotiation of mega-FTAs,
notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
I. Fragmentation of Global Trade Governance
and Its Background
One of the two aspects of the fragmentation of
global trade governance is the malfunction of the
WTO as a forum for trade liberalization and trade
rule-making. In particular, the stalemate of the
DDA is serious. Looking back on the history of
the DDA, it was in July 2008 that the negotiation
came closest to its conclusion. Chairpersons of the
negotiating groups on agriculture and non-agri-
cultural market access (NAMA) submitted draft
texts in early July, and the WTO members negoti-
ated on the modalities of market access on these
two subjects at the informal ministerial meeting
in late July. Once members agree on the modali-
ties, they have only to implement trade liberaliza-
tion according to the modalities. In that sense, the
negotiation on the modalities was the key to the
successful conclusion of the DDA. However,
members couldn’t reach agreement on the modal-
ities because of the confrontation between the US
and India on the conditions for India and other
developing countries to apply special safeguard
measures on agricultural products. Confrontation
between the US and India on this relatively minor
issue is not the major reason for the stalemate of
the DDA. But it is at least emblematic of the diffi-
culty of the DDA, which is totally different from
the multilateral trade negotiations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
During the GATT era, the US, EU, Japan and
Canada, or the Quad, could conclude multilateral
trade negotiations by reaching agreement among
themselves, bringing the results to the plenary
meeting and adopting them by consensus. How-
ever, as a result of the changed power relation-
ship among the members at the WTO, this no
longer works at the DDA. Instead, there must be
agreement among the new key members, namely,
the US, EU, China, India, and Brazil, for the nego-
tiation to be concluded. These key members dis-
agree on many issues of the DDA negotiating
agenda. This is the main cause of the stalemate of
the DDA. As this is a change in the power struc-
ture of the WTO members, it is very difficult to
resolve it at least in the near future.
The other aspect of the fragmentation of global
trade governance is the proliferation of FTAs. The
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number of FTAs was 17 in 1990. It was 83 in 2000
and 252 in September 2013. One of the reasons for
the proliferation of FTAs is the domino effect of
FTAs (Baldwin 1993). Once an FTA is concluded,
trade between a party to it and a non-party may
be impeded (trade diversion). The non-party may,
therefore, want to conclude a new FTA with the
party to the first FTA. Another reason for the pro-
liferation of FTAs is the delay and stalemate of
the multilateral trade negotiation. The delay of
the Uruguay Round motivated the US to negoti-
ate the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The stalemate of the DDA has motivat-
ed many more countries to negotiate FTAs. How-
ever, this does not mean that WTO members sim-
ply choose between the WTO and FTAs as a
forum for trade liberalization and trade rule-mak-
ing, because the recent FTAs cover a far wider
range of subject matter than is covered by the
WTO.
Figure 1 shows that the WTO and FTAs aim at
different goals, as they cover different sets of sub-
ject matter. While the WTO aims mainly at liberal-
ization of trade in goods and services and protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, recent FTAs
not only aim at these goals but also at liberaliza-
tion of investment and government procurement.
They also cover a wide range of regulations that
contribute to the improvement of business envi-
ronment for private firms in party nations. In
sum, they aim at deep integration.
Why, then, do recent FTAs aim at deep integra-
tion? It is because of the globalization of value
chains (GVC) that has rapidly advanced since the
1990s. GVC is realized through the breaking-up of
production processes beyond borders. Innova-
tions in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) and transportation technologies
enabled GVC since the 1990s, but they were not
the sole reasons for the phenomenon. GVC needs
a set of policy innovations that allow the effective
and efficient management of globalized value
chains by private firms.
Table 1 shows that firms engaged in GVC need a
wider range of policy measures than is covered
by the WTO, and recent FTAs cover most of them.
This was the major reason for the recent prolifera-
tion of FTAs. GVC required FTAs, and FTAs have
enhanced GVC.
There is, however, a mismatch between GVC and
FTAs. As GVC is formed among many countries,
it requires the conclusion of many FTAs. This will
take time and cost for negotiation. Even if a suffi-
cient number of FTAs are concluded, difference in
their contents causes inconvenience. Conflicting
rules of origin is a notable example.
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Figure 1. WTO+ and WTO-X provisions of the FTAs concluded since the 1990s
(Source: WTO, Updated dataset on the content of PTAs, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_dataset_e.htm)
II. From Fragmentation to Integration
While the WTO is malfunctioning as a forum for
trade liberalization and trade rule making, FTAs
are not the optimal means for sustaining the effec-
tive and efficient management of GVC due to the
mismatch between them and GVC. The TPP may
overcome these flaws for the following three rea-
sons. First, the TPP is a mega-FTA involving 12
countries in the Asia-Pacific, and it may develop
into the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific
(FTAAP) as more countries in the region join it.
Expansion of the TPP territory will ease the mis-
match between GVC and the TPP. Second, the
TPP is aiming at becoming the model of 21st cen-
tury FTA with high level and comprehensive
rules and commitments for deep integration. In
addition to most of the WTO+ and WTO-X rules
enumerated in Figure 1, the TPP will introduce
several innovative rules for the efficient manage-
ment of GVC, such as discipline of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and regulatory coherence.
Third, several mega-FTAs are under negotiation.
They are the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the US and EU, the
East Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) among ASEAN members and
Japan, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and
India, and the trilateral FTA among Japan, China
and Korea. As the TPP is likely to be the first
mega-FTA to be concluded, the rules of the TPP
may become de facto global standards, as they
may be referred to in the negotiation of other
mega-FTAs.
This scenario is, however, still not an optimal one
for curving the fragmentation of global trade gov-
ernance. In fact, firms engaged in globalization of
value chains strictly select their trade/investment
counterparts so as to maximize their profits.
Countries excluded from GVC are most likely
least developed countries. Income disparity
between those countries selected and excluded
will become entrenched and tend to increase
overtime. Poverty and social instability in the lat-
ter will be aggravated. This will cause serious
problems to global peace and security.
In order to avoid these serious consequences of
GVC, it is necessary to provide a chance to join
GVC to all the countries in the world, so that they
may compete in putting in place regulatory and
institutional environments for the effective and
efficient management of GVC. Reinvigorating the
WTO will be the best means for this, as the WTO
is well equipped with the institutional mecha-
nisms by which members at different levels of
development and capability may come up with
the rules and commitment of the WTO in a grad-
ual and steady manner. These include a wide
range of special and differential treatments
(S&D), capacity building, and Aid-for-Trade.
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Table 1. Policies needed for the globalization of value chains
Policy areas for GVC
Policies for the reduction of service link
costs
Policies for the reduction
of production costs of each
production process
Policy measures needed
Trade liberalization; Trade facilitation;
Enhancement of logistics/telecommunication/
financial services;
Liberalization of movement of business persons;
Harmonization of laws and regulations
Human resource development;
Liberalization/facilitation of investment;
Enhancement of production support services;
Trade liberalization; Trade facilitation;
Protection of intellectual property rights;
Competition policy;
Harmonization of laws and regulations;
Development of supporting industries;
Formation of industrial agglomeration
(Source: Created by the author based on Kimura 2012.)
By transplanting the rules and commitments of
the TPP to the WTO, those rules and commit-
ments will become truly global, and WTO mem-
bers, whether developed or developing, will have
a chance to join global value chains gradually but
steadily. The WTO will be reinvigorated with new
rules and commitments that will match the needs
of GVC, and we may coin it WTO 2.0.
Seventy years have passed since the inception of
the GATT/WTO system for governing global
trade. The 21st century global economy, character-
ized by GVC, needs fundamental reform of its
governance structure. WTO 2.0 will not be built
by totally scrapping the existing institutions and
replacing them with new ones. Rather, WTO 2.0
will be realized by fine-tuning the functions of the
existing institution, and giving it new functions to
meet the needs of GVC. What is needed is an
insight into the changing patterns of global econ-
omy in the 21st century, and an innovative and
evolutionary approach to reinvigorate the exist-
ing institutions for global trade governance.
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As the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotia-
tions with the 12 international trading partners
nears conclusion after five long years of hard bar-
gaining, the battle for the future of the agreement
inside the United States is heating up. There are
two key elements of the fight: Congressional
approval of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
and passage of the implementing legislation nec-
essary to bring it into force in the United States. In
both areas, interest group pressures are likely to
be substantial, making ratification of the TPP
uncertain.
In the U.S., Congress has the authority to regulate
commerce, which includes setting tariffs. But get-
ting 535 members of Congress to negotiate trade
agreements is not practical, so historically the
executive branch has handled these tasks. In the
1970s, this arrangement was formalized. Congress
explicitly gave the role of negotiating trade agree-
ments to the White House subject to a number of
specific provisions.
Under what used to be called “fast track” and is
now labeled “Trade Promotion Authority” (TPA),
Congress is to be notified of the intention to
launch negotiations.1 Congress is given 90 days to
respond. The United States Trade Representative
(USTR) office is also tasked with gathering infor-
mation about the future direction and important
elements for the talks during this time period
from a range of key stakeholders including busi-
ness groups. After the initial comment period is
concluded, USTR is required to keep Congress
informed as negotiations continue. Finally, Con-
gress has promised to vote the entire trade agree-
ment up or down without amendment at the end
by a simple majority vote in both chambers.2 The
timeline is shown in Table 1.
Ideally, prior to the start of new negotiations,
USTR would receive TPA from Congress, with the
broad parameters and objectives set for any trade
agreements to be negotiated during the time cov-
ered by the approval. However, this was not done
for the TPP as the latest version of TPA expired in
2007.
The outgoing George W. Bush administration
announced its intention to join what became the
TPP in September 2008. The Obama White House
decided not to press Congress for renewal of TPA
in 2009, but rather started negotiations in March
2010 by following the provisions of TPA “as if” it
were active.
Over all the years of TPP negotiations, the White
TPP and the United States: Challenges and
Opportunities
Deborah ELMS
1 For the best review of the history and evolution of fast track, see I.M. Destler, 2005, American Trade Politics, 4th edition, (Washington DC:
International Institute for Economics). For a recent discussion of issues, see William Cooper, January 13, 2014, “Trade Promotion Authority
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy,” Congressional Research Service 7-5700. Access at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33743.pdf.
2 Technically, TPA is a Congressional-Executive Agreement, which is why it needs approval of both houses of Congress (unlike Executive
Actions, which do not need Congressional approval at all or treaties that require 2/3 of the Senate).
House never seriously pursued the votes in Con-
gress to support renewal of TPA.3 But now, as
talks enter the closing phase, TPA is necessary to
finish the agreement. Without TPA, Congress can
amend the agreement from the opening sentence
to the closing word. It could also allow the agree-
ment to die in committee or tangle ratification in
an endless filibuster. In short, without the provi-
sions of TPA in place prior to the closure of the
agreement, the TPP will likely fail to be ratified
by Congress.4
The first problem for 2015, then, is to secure pas-
sage of TPA. The last time the bill was autho-
rized, in 2002, the votes were very close:
approval by 215 to 212 in the House of Represen-
tatives and by a margin of 64 to 34 in the Senate.5
All indications are that a TPA vote may be equal-
ly close this time.
Even the passage of TPA, however, does not mean
smooth sailing for a TPP deal. In authorizing
TPA, many members of Congress want to place
strict conditions on elements of a final deal that
must be present before they will grant approval.
Most controversial is an ongoing discussion of
including legally binding rules to prevent trade
agreement members from manipulating their cur-
rencies.6
Until now, currency issues like manipulation or
currency controls have been kept out of the TPP.
There is no appetite within the other TPP member
countries to include such rules, and certainly
there is no interest in adding in an extremely con-
troversial set of provisions at this late date in
negotiations. Hence, a decision by Congress to
insist on such currency rules in TPA approval in
2015 will be deeply problematic for the TPP.
Ideally, TPA will be granted—as it has always
been—for a range of trade agreements and not
simply given for the TPP. The United States is
simultaneously engaged in multiple negotiations
over trade: with the European Union in the
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP); with nearly two dozen countries on the
sidelines of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); with
80 countries at the WTO in updating the Informa-
tion Technology Agreement (ITA); and with more
than 160 countries in the WTO in the Doha
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3 President Obama did ask for TPA on January 30, 2013, but did not push very hard to receive it.
4 Technically, Congress does not ratify trade agreements. But to bring them into force, Congress must pass implementing legislation to bring
existing laws into compliance with the newly negotiated international obligations. TPA provisions also streamline the procedures for doing
so and prevent the deal from getting stuck while under review.
5 A 1998 vote went down to failure with a vote of 180-243 in the House.
6 For example, see “Brown, Levin Working on Currency Legislation Reminiscent of Earlier Bills,” Inside US Trade, January 16, 2015, Vol. 33 No. 2.
Table 1: Congressional Timelines
Source: Cooper, CRS, January 13, 2014
Development Agenda (DDA). All will need a ver-
sion of TPA, at least before any agreement can be
implemented and enter into force for the United
States.
Once TPA has been granted, the fight over trade
inside the U.S. will not be over. Instead, different
groups are likely to engage in potentially bitter
arguments over the provisions of the TPP as Con-
gress grapples with whether or not to approve
this specific trade deal.
Even for less controversial agreements, passage of
the final legislation for free trade agreements
(FTAs) has been far from assured. Congress
approved the three most recent FTAs, with
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, on October
12, 2011.7 The votes were largely along partisan
lines with many Democrats in Congress voting
against President Obama.8
The TPP is a much more complicated and chal-
lenging agreement. Many provisions will require
changes in domestic rules and regulations. Sec-
tors that have not been affected by previous
trade agreements may face new issues in the
TPP. For example, the agreement drops tariffs to
zero on 90 percent of goods trade on entry into
force, which may impose new competitive chal-
lenges on some industries from the very begin-
ning.
Sectors, firms and industries that believe they will
be negatively affected, especially by the removal
of previous protections of one sort or another, can
be expected to lobby furiously to block the imple-
mentation of the TPP in the United States. They
will likely find a receptive audience, especially
from some members of Congress.
Trade agreements have always been problematic
for Democrats given their historical ties to the
labor and union movements. Additional chal-
lenges come from the environmental wing of the
party, as opening trade is assumed to undermine
environmental protections. Although changing,
the party has not been as closely tied to the busi-
ness community. 
An additional complication in securing support
from Democrats for the TPP will be the legacy of
the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The battle over NAFTA was long and
bitter. In the end, President Bill Clinton defied his
party to push for the conclusion of the deal to tie
the United States more closely with Canada and
Mexico.9
The debate around NAFTA was highly charged
with supporters overselling the benefits and
opponents making wild claims (Ross Perot, a US
Presidential candidate, famously called NAFTA a
“giant sucking sound” of American jobs heading
to Mexico in one of the debates.10)
In the 20 years since NAFTA was approved, the
evidence on the benefits to the American econo-
my has been largely mixed. In this relatively
uncertain environment, opponents have been
quick to seize on examples of companies that
moved operations into Mexico. Some will likely
argue that a similar loss of jobs will take place
under TPP.11
Against a backdrop of—at best—lukewarm
Democratic support, the TPP will require Repub-
licans to line up in support of the agreement. In
the past, Republicans largely voted in favor of
trade agreements. Now, however, the Republican
party is also split. Many members of the party are
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7 House votes for the three were: 262 to 167 for Colombia; 300 to 129; and 278 to 151 respectively while the Senate voted 66 to 33; 77 to 22; and
83 to 15 for the Korean agreement.
8 For a nice interactive summary of the votes, see Binyamin Applebaum and Jennifer Steinhauer, “Congress Ends a 5 Year Standoff on Trade
Deals in Rare Accord,” New York Times, October 12, 2011, accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/business/trade-bills-near-
final-chapter.html?pagewanted=all.
9 In the final vote, Democrats split. The House voted 234 to 200 and the Senate was 61 to 38. The Democrats were almost evenly divided in
both chambers. (The vote over the next deal, the Central American Free Trade Agreement or CAFTA, was even closer. If even one House
member had changed a “yes” vote to “no,” the agreement would have failed in 2005 by 216-216.)
10 See his remarks in the 1992 Debate at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rkgx1C_S6ls
11 See, for example, remarks by Democrat Congresswoman DeLauro, “DeLauro Breaks with Obama, Big CT Firms on Pacific Trade Deal,”
Hartford Courant, January 12, 2015; comments by Elizabeth Warren, “Senator Warren’s Remarks at AFL-CIO National Summit on Raising
Wages,” January 7, 2015 (accessed at: http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=696); or Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Democrats Step
Up Efforts to Block Obama’s Trade Agenda,” New York Times, January 8, 2015.
firmly opposed to any type of foreign entangle-
ments, especially those in the Tea Party wing.
Others are simply loath to give President Obama
a victory in anything at all. Hence, unified sup-
port by Republicans for the TPP cannot be taken
as a given.
In this environment, the votes needed to bring the
TPP into force in the United States may very well
be closer than ever. The President and his team
will need to mount an aggressive campaign to
ensure that the 12-nation deal does not collapse at
the finish line in Washington DC.
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Free trade agreements (FTAs) have been a feature
of the international trade landscape for decades.
Their rapid proliferation over the course of the
still-incomplete World Trade Organization (WTO)
Doha Round of negotiations has given rise to con-
cerns that such agreements are stumbling blocks
rather than stepping stones along the path to fur-
ther multilateral trade liberalization. The difficul-
ties identified with FTAs include that they divert
capital and human resources away from negotiat-
ing in the WTO; they make concluding the Doha
Round more challenging because they often
exclude sensitive sectors such as agriculture, leav-
ing the most difficult areas to liberalize on the
WTO table without the easier concessions left as a
sweetener; and that FTA dispute settlement poses
a risk of fragmenting international trade jurispru-
dence by reaching decisions inconsistent with
those reached by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body. Such concerns are more driven by the sheer
volume of FTAs than by any individual agree-
ment, per se. Indeed, FTAs have, until recently,
had a number of similarities. First, with a few
exceptions, FTAs have primarily tracked the WTO
in terms of subject coverage, with new areas, if
any, generally limited to hortatory, “best endeav-
ors” language and excluded from dispute settle-
ment. Second, FTAs have been overwhelmingly
bilateral (treating the EU as one). And third, FTAs
have sometimes combined a large economy with
a smaller economy, and sometimes two smaller
economies with each other, but the largest
economies were not forming FTAs with each
other. Thus no one FTA captured a particularly
large percentage of world trade. There have been
striking changes, however, in the past few years,
with several “mega” FTAs now under negotia-
tion. These include the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the China-Japan-
Korea FTA (CJK), and the EU-Japan FTA. The new
mega-FTAs have a number of implications – in
addition to those identified above – for global
governance. This piece will focus on the TPP and
the RCEP, with some references to other mega-
FTAs as appropriate. It will first briefly describe
the TPP and the RCEP in the context of a new
generation of mega-FTAs, and second, discuss
three implications of the new mega-FTAs for
global governance: the lack of developing country
participation; the potential for inconsistencies in
dispute settlement outcomes; and the challenges
of returning to the WTO negotiating table.
I. Features of the Mega-FTAs
The new mega-FTAs differ from their twentieth
century counterparts in a number of respects.
First, these agreements are linking large
economies with each other for the first time. The
United States is negotiating with the EU in the
TTIP; Japan and the United States are negotiating
together in the TPP; Japan, China and Korea are
negotiating together in CJK and the RCEP; and
Japan and the EU are negotiating a bilateral FTA.
TPP and RCEP: Implications of Mega-FTAs for
Global Governance
Meredith Kolsky LEWIS
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Second, some of the agreements are linking a
large number of countries: the RCEP negotiations
include 16 countries, and the TPP comprises 12
countries. Third, each of these negotiations is cap-
turing a much higher percentage of global GDP
than any previous FTA. The TTIP is estimated to
encompass 37 percent of world GDP; the TPP will
account for 31.5 percent; and the RCEP for 30 per-
cent. Fourth, some of these agreements – particu-
larly the TTIP and the TPP – are addressing new
issues such as regulatory coherence, competition,
and state-owned enterprises.
A. The TPP
The TPP negotiations have their origins in the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement entered into by Brunei, Chile, New
Zealand, and Singapore in 2005. This agreement,
known colloquially as the P-4 Trade Agreement or
just “P-4,” was an effort by its members to create
a high standards agreement that would serve as a
model for a future FTA of the Asia-Pacific (Lewis
2009; 2011). The P-4 countries committed to bring-
ing tariffs to zero on all tariff lines – a marked dif-
ference from most FTAs, in which agriculture and
other sensitive sectors are generally excluded in
whole or in large part from liberalization commit-
ments. The P-4 also features an open accession
clause, which permits other countries to accede to
the agreement subject to the approval of the exist-
ing members.
The P-4 provided that, two years after coming
into force, additional negotiations would com-
mence to broaden the scope of the agreement to
include financial services and investment. At the
time those additional negotiations were about to
start, the United States indicated its interest in
observing the negotiations. Officials from the
United States Trade Representative office made it
known that if they found the negotiations of suffi-
cient interest, they would seek to join the agree-
ment. When that statement of interest became
public, Australia, Peru, Malaysia, and Vietnam
quickly indicated they would also like to partici-
pate. Shortly thereafter, the original P-4 countries
plus the five newcomers formed a nine-country
negotiating group.
The United States signaled that the countries
would be negotiating a new trade agreement, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, rather than the new-
comers acceding to the P-4. Nonetheless, the TPP’s
origins clearly lie in the P-4. From the start, the
TPP has been touted as a “twenty-first century
trade agreement” (United States Trade Represen-
tative; Lim, Elms and Low 2012). The negotiations
began with the premise that there would be no per
se market access exclusions. In addition, the
breadth of the agreement is broad, with several
chapters covering topics not included within the
scope of the WTO, including state-owned enter-
prises, investment, and regulatory coherence.
In 2012 and 2013, Canada, Mexico, and Japan
joined the negotiations bringing the total parties
to 12. While it now seems likely that a few sensi-
tive products will be excluded from meaningful
market access commitments, the TPP will
nonetheless feature a range of commitments not
found in other FTAs.
B. The RCEP
The RCEP is a negotiation that combines the ten
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) with six countries that already
have “+1” FTAs with ASEAN – China, Japan,
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India.1
Because ASEAN already has “hub and spoke”
FTAs with each of the +1 countries, the real trade
gains from the RCEP will result from new link-
ages amongst the spokes – i.e. from the +1 coun-
tries linking with each other. In particular, China,
Japan, and Korea are currently negotiating an
FTA (“C-J-K”) which will facilitate the RCEP
negotiations. The RCEP is, however, more signifi-
cant as a geostrategic matter rather than as a trade
agreement. While the RCEP is not expected to be
particularly novel as a trade agreement, it is of
strategic importance that Japan, China, and Korea
– countries with a long history of chilly relations –
will come together and bring their economic and
political power to this 16-country collaboration.
The RCEP can also be viewed as China’s answer
to the TPP. While the TPP and RCEP have seven
countries in common, China is only in the RCEP
and the United States is only in the TPP.
1 Australia and New Zealand negotiated collectively in forming an FTA with ASEAN, thus their agreement is also considered a “+1”.
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II. Implications of the New Mega-FTAs for
Global Governance
The new mega-FTAs such as the TPP, RCEP, and
TTIP have many implications that extend beyond
the reaches of the agreements themselves to the
global trading community. Below I highlight three
such implications.
A. Legitimacy Concerns due to Lack of Develop-
ing Countries
As noted above, the new mega-FTAs are linking
large developed economies for the first time. This
will concentrate a significant degree of economic
might in each agreement. To the extent the negoti-
ations are covering new issues, it is likely that the
global rules of the future will emerge from mega-
FTA negotiations. This is particularly true for the
TTIP and TPP processes, which have more ambi-
tious negotiating agendas than the RCEP. If the
mega-FTAs do indeed give rise to the rules and
standards of the future, some may find this out-
come raises legitimacy concerns. While the TTIP
and TPP both comprise large shares of world
GDP, most of the world’s countries are excluded
from these FTA negotiations with poorer develop-
ing countries the most notably absent. Develop-
ing countries are therefore likely to be asked to
adopt standards established in TTIP and/or the
TPP, without having had any opportunity to have
input into those rules.
B. Potential for Dispute Settlement Inconsistencies
To the extent mega-FTAs include chapters and
other provisions that go beyond the scope of the
WTO, there is an increased potential for inconsis-
tent dispute settlement rulings. For countries that
have formed FTAs that largely mirror the WTO in
coverage, the parties have generally opted to take
their disputes to the WTO rather than to the FTA
dispute settlement mechanism. This choice may
not be available for certain disputes arising out of
the new mega-FTAs, however. If a dispute
involves a commitment that does not overlap
with the WTO – for example, an issue relating to
state-owned enterprises – that dispute cannot be
said to be covered by the WTO agreements, and a
WTO dispute settlement panel would likely
decline to resolve the dispute. Thus such disputes
would need to be brought to FTA dispute settle-
ment. Where the risk of conflicting decisions aris-
es is if the disputes involving FTA-only issues
also involve issues with WTO overlap, such as
alleged breaches of the most-favored nation oblig-
ation or national treatment. It is unlikely that par-
ties would bring two separate disputes, one in the
WTO and one within the FTA dispute settlement
process. Instead, the FTA arbiters will end up
resolving issues that would in the past have been
resolved within the WTO. Conflicting decisions
are not inevitable, but do become more likely
with mega-FTAs.
C. Increases Difficulty in Returning to WTO
Negotiating Table
A final implication the mega-FTAs have for global
governance is their impact on the participants’
willingness to engage at the WTO negotiating
table. In the past, while FTAs posed challenges for
the WTO, at least the major economies saw the
WTO as the forum in which they could obtain
trade concessions from each other. Now, however,
with the U.S. partnering with Japan in the TPP
and Europe in the TTIP; Europe and Japan form-
ing their own FTA; and China, Japan, and Korea
linking in the RCEP and the C-J-K FTA, the big
players are obtaining important market opportu-
nities from each other outside the WTO frame-
work. This dynamic suggests that it is going to be
even harder, going forward, to get the WTO’s
largest economies to see enough potential benefits
to return to the multilateral negotiating table.
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At the time I was kindly invited by my friend,
Professor Junji Nakagawa, to write something on
China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks for
this distinguished newsletter series, it had
appeared to me to be a simple task. China was
not after all in the TPP, and it was not certain that
it would ever wish to be.
The question of China’s eventual participation
was something which Deborah Elms, Patrick
Low, and myself had discussed when writing our
2012 book, The Trans-Pacific Partnership.1 I can
reveal here that in our discussions, one view
which we debated was that “China is irrelevant.”
Of course the question of China’s participation, at
that time, had not arisen as a practical issue. But
saying that the question itself is irrelevant goes
too far. I was satisfied with what we wrote in the
end – that the true question, going forward, was
whether the TPP will be a genuinely high-stan-
dard trade agreement. If the treaty ends up being
driven mainly by strategic considerations at the
expense of achieving deep and broad trade con-
cessions, it would result in negligible trade diver-
sion, present little threat to China in trade terms,
and China will have less reason to join the TPP.2
Subsequent events seemed to confirm that China
was, in any case, being deliberately excluded
from new trade initiatives, not just in respect of
the TPP but also in the Trade in Services Agree-
ment (TISA) negotiations in Geneva. As the
months and years went by, it also seemed that, to
borrow Hatakeyama Noboru’s perspective on
regional trade policy initiatives,3 freezing China
out would trigger a “dialectical process,” begin-
ning with China’s own disengagement from exist-
ing multilateral and plurilateral initiatives – rang-
ing from the WTO to the TPP. On this view, China
will eventually propose or actively support the
creation of new, alternative initiatives either of its
own, or those which will be much closer to its
potential sphere of influence. We then began to
see this with the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP). The term “mega-
regionals” gained currency and people began to
refer to RCEP as “China’s TPP.” It seemed to sup-
port an emerging thesis that China was turning
towards the creation of parallel, mega-regional
structures which will at least allow for its own,
significant participation.
But as China was about to assume the Chair of
APEC in early 2014, there was also a sense, or at
least a hope, that we would witness new initia-
tives by China which could foster a closer co-
operative relationship with the United States in
China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Chin Leng LIM
1 Lim, C.L., Deborah K Elms, and Patrick Low (eds.). 2012. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-first Century Trade Agreement.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Ibid. 325.
3 Hatakeyama, Noboru. 2003. “A Short History of Japan’s Movement to FTAs (Part 3).” Journal of Japanese Trade & Industry 22: 42.
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regional trade policy. This we saw, subsequently,
in Qingdao in May 2014 when China proposed a
road-map and, originally, even a target-date for a
Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).4 The
FTAAP is not in itself a new idea. There had been
a notable debate in the Financial Times almost a
decade ago on having FTAAP as a “Plan B” to the
Doha Round negotiations.5 China’s “Qingdao
proposal” faced objections but APEC ministers
agreed upon a working group co-chaired by
China and the United States. The idea of a target
date was rejected, and a precondition was that the
discussions in the working group will not be mis-
taken for pre-negotiations.
China’s approach had begun to take on the famil-
iar appearance of a “multi-prong” FTA negotia-
tion strategy. At the same time, it appeared to
some other observers that the combination of
RCEP and a proposal that concrete steps should
be taken towards FTAAP were not only comple-
mentary, but that through RCEP, China could put
in place “its own” building-block – i.e. as
opposed to the United States’ – towards the cre-
ation of an eventual FTAAP. The TPP would, on
this view, become an alternate path to achieving
FTAAP.6
At the same time, a much anticipated rebalancing
of the Chinese economy was announced. A clear
policy consensus had emerged in Beijing to turn
away from reliance on investment in manufactur-
ing towards greater liberalization in China’s ser-
vices sector, and more broadly towards the
restructuring and further liberalization of China’s
economy.7 These elements have now also paved a
path for China to the TPP.8 It had once been the
refrain – directed against any Chinese ambition
towards joining the TPP talks – that China would,
first, have to be able to meet the TPP’s high ambi-
tions. However, China is now saying: “Yes, in fact
we welcome a high-standard agreement.” What
we are seeing, at this time, is a strong signal from
China that the moment is ripe to seek member-
ship of the TPP talks.
As I said earlier, I am a strong believer in
Hatakeyama Noboru’s dialectical view of East
Asian regional trade policy initiatives. Like the
dialectical method itself as an intellectual tool, the
regional and trans-continental treaty policies we
have been discussing have thus far taken place
largely at the level of intellectual debate. In the
physical world, there is no TPP, no RCEP, and no
FTAAP. But for the constant announcements of
ever-more fantastic deadlines, no-one is certain
that there will necessarily even be a TPP, or that
even if there will be a TPP, how much of it will in
fact resemble its ferocious past advertisements.
What we have had for the past 10 to 15 years is,
instead, a great debate about the future treaty
architecture for trade in the Asia-Pacific. Each
new proposal, accompanied by rounds of sub-
stantive negotiations, encounters an opposing
proposal which has, in turn, led to an eventual
synthesis of the contending proposals. I have
described this process elsewhere, but here now is
another example – RCEP was an intellectual
response to the “thesis” that there should be a
TPP, followed by a dialectical “synthesis” of the
two ideas in the form of what is now a proposal
that steps should be taken towards realizing
FTAAP.
If this way of looking at developments in recent
years is correct, the question then becomes this:
What will be the “antithesis” to the proposed
roadmap for FTAAP? It also means that when we
ask about whether China will join the TPP, we
should not forget why and how that question
may be important.
So my mind turns back to that late afternoon in
November 2011 when my co-editors and I com-
pleted our book. So much has changed in the two
years since its publication. We now know why
asking about China’s participation in the TPP is
4 Li, Jiabao. 19 May 2014. “APEC Ministers’ Agreements include Completed Road Map for Free Trade.” China Daily. Beijing.
5 Bergsten, Fred. 16 August 2006. “Plan B for World Trade: Go Regional”. Financial Times. London; Cho, Sungjoon. 22 August 2005. “‘Plan B’ is
Always Inferior to ‘Plan A’.” Financial Times. London.
6 Jacobi, Stephen. 13 November 2013. “Regional economic integration: Is it all headed in the same direction?” Address to NZIIA Symposium
“Asia Pacific Integration: The Economic and Security Dimensions for New Zealand.” Wellington.
7 See e.g. Silk, Richard. 17 July 2014. “Yes, China Is Beginning to ‘Rebalance,’ But There’s a Long Way to Go.” Wall Street Journal.
8 Tiezzi, Shannon. 10 October 2014. “Will China Join the TPP?” The Diplomat. Tokyo.
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intellectually relevant: not because China now
says it wishes to participate and is ready to join
the talks but because it is proposing the eventual
realization of FTAAP.
What will be the antithesis to China’s current the-
sis? If China bids for a place in TPP talks and is
rebuffed, then an altogether different dialectic
will emerge - RCEP will become China’s sole,
immediate avenue towards the eventual realisa-
tion of FTAAP.   The dialectical response to that
may in turn be that, at some currently still-distant
juncture in the future, the idea for merging RCEP
and the TPP will be seriously pursued. Possibly
as another intermediate step towards the creation
of FTAAP.
So whether China joins the TPP talks in the short-
to-medium term, or whether it does so through a
potential future merger of RCEP and the TPP,
much in the way ASEAN, Australia and New
Zealand had once “combined” the ASEAN FTA
with the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic
Agreement (ANZCERTA) under the Angkor
Agenda, what we are truly witnessing today is
China’s bid to shape the Asia-Pacific trade treaty
architecture through alternate pathways – just as
it has taken the decision to further liberalize its
economy.
Because we also know something about the possi-
ble directions which this dialectical process will
take, expertise is now being focused on common
issues such as the importance of reducing regula-
tory divergence between RCEP and the TPP. The
question of the harmonization of preferential
rules of origin is an obvious example of this.
There are stark differences between ASEAN’s,
and therefore also RCEP’s, approach towards
ROOs and the US approach; not least in the use
by the US of product-specific rules. In other areas,
such as the employment of a negative-list
approach towards services commitments, there is
already a confluence of intended approaches in
discussions about the modalities for negotiating
RCEP and for negotiating the TPP. Similarly, the
employment of a negative-list and a US-style pre-
establishment (or “market access”) clause, which
will impose disciplines on restrictions to foreign
investment entry in the negotiations towards a
US-China bilateral investment treaty, will be an
important building-block. These are all but illus-
trations of the kinds of factors which should be
taken into account in assessing the range of possi-
ble, and alternate, future outcomes. 
Could it be that we will reach the point where
China, having engaged in this multi-dimensional,
multi-treaty-led restructuring of its economy,
might one day find that it is closer to the ideal of
realizing FTAAP than even the United States? If
the past is any indication of the future, it is not so
far-fetched an idea. 
But in order to get to RCEP, China needed its
experience of entering into a China-ASEAN FTA
(CAFTA), and it needs to advance negotiations
towards a China-Japan-South Korea FTA (CJKF-
TA). At the time of writing, the China-South Korea
deal has just been concluded. For China, the TPP’s
value is similar, as is the value of the China-US
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations.
Both provide partial glimpses of a broader, poten-
tial reality. The true issue is not whether the
“China Question” is relevant to the way we study
the TPP, but whether and how the TPP is relevant
to China. It is relevant to China, but in the context
of the Asia-Pacific trade policy dialectic it is not in
my view critical.
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Introduction 
After entering the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1955, Japan’s trade policies
embraced multilateralism for decades, even as
other nations across the globe entered into free
trade agreements (FTA) and pursued regional
economic integration. Finally, in the late 1990s,
Japan made a shift to “Multi-layered Trade Poli-
cy” through separate bilateral, regional, and glob-
al trade agreements. After the Doha Round of
WTO negotiations reached an impasse, Japan’s
policymakers turned to entering FTAs or EPAs
(Economic Partnership Agreements).
The first phase of Japan’s FTA strategy was form-
ing bilateral FTAs with members of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations and other emerg-
ing countries in the 2000s. Currently Japan is
switching to the second phase of its strategy in
which the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) figures
prominently. TPP clearly differs from the FTAs of
the first phase in several ways. The process of
deciding whether to participate in TPP talks
prompted Japan to rethink its FTA strategy. Now
that Japan has joined TPP negotiations, whether
or not it can implement a new trade strategy
remains an open question. This paper addresses
that question by first clarifying the differences
between FTAs that Japan has already entered into
and the TPP and then by discussing the implica-
tions of the TPP for Japan’s trade policies.
Three Differences between Japan’s FTAs and
the TPP
Before joining the TPP talks in July 2013, Japan
entered into FTAs with 12 nations and one region,
ASEAN.1 Domestically, whether Japan should
participate in TPP talks sparked an intense debate
that lasted for more than three years until the
decision to enter TPP talks was finally made.
Thereafter, intense opposition to entering a TPP
agreement has continued unabated in Japan. The
fact that 13 FTAs which Japan had ratified earlier
generated no such resistance is a striking indica-
tion of the large differences between these FTAs
and the TPP.
What are these differences? If we delve into the
details, we can find a multitude of factors that
make FTAs distinct from the TPP, but here the
focus is on three major differences related to
Japan’s broader trade policies. First, the TPP is
intended to achieve a high level of trade liberal-
ization. Second, the TPP will have comprehen-
sive, “high-standard” rules. Third, the TPP is
meant to be a “mega-FTA” that affects not only
the regional trade order, but the global trade
order as well. These three characteristics contrast
strongly with Japan’s current FTAs.
A High Level of Trade Liberalization
Article XXIV of the GATT allows for the creation
of FTAs provided the agreements remove barriers
to “substantially all trade.” To meet this require-
ment, Japan’s FTAs are structured so that the
value of bilateral trade in liberalized products
equals at least 90 percent of the value of all goods
The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Japan’s Trade
Policy
SUGAWARA Junichi
1 Japan and Australia also signed an FTA in July 2014, but this paper examines only the 13 FTAs that preceded Japan’s joining the TPP talks.
Although the Japanese government calls these trade deals “Economic Partnership Agreements,” this paper refers to them as FTAs, the more
commonly used term.
Page 18 Social Science Japan March 2015
traded between the two nations. However, there
is no denying that the degree of liberalization
achieved under Japan’s FTAs was limited. If one
counts the rate of liberalization of Japan’s FTAs in
terms of tariff lines, not a single one of Japan’s 
13 FTAs liberalized more than 90 percent of trade
between the signatories. While FTAs involving
other advanced economies shows that they gener-
ally liberalize at least 95 percent of trade, Japan’s
FTAs kept tariffs in place for more than 10 percent
of all tariff lines.
Given that the TPP aims to abolish tariffs on all
goods in principle, Japan must pledge to liberal-
ize on a much greater scale that it has to date in
its FTAs. Most of the products that Japan is being
pushed to liberalize are agricultural products—
especially rice, beef, pork, wheat, barley, dairy
products, and sweeteners—that have long been
treated by the government as “sacrosanct.”
Domestic resistance to removing agricultural tar-
iffs is intense and implacable, but major agricul-
tural exporters, including not only the United
States (the leading exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts to Japan), but also Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, are involved in the TPP. As a
result, Japan is under pressure to liberalize trade
in products that it kept protected under its FTAs.
Drafting Comprehensive, High-standard Rules
The TPP’s proponents claim it will be a “compre-
hensive, high-standard, 21st-century FTA.”
Unlike “twentieth century” agreements that pri-
marily dealt with import barriers such as tariffs, a
“twenty-first century” agreement would priori-
tize lowering non-tariff barriers such as domestic
regulations and institutions.
TPP negotiations include an array of topics, such
as intellectual property rights, the environment,
labor, harmonization of domestic regulations, and
state-owned enterprises in competition policy,
whose standard and scope greatly exceed the
trade rules covered in WTO agreements and exist-
ing FTAs. The TPP talks include policy areas that
have never before been subject to trade agree-
ments. Negotiations over 21 policy areas are
underway. One of the areas, “cross-cutting
issues,” which covers topics such as regulatory
coherence, is not dealt with in Japan’s FTAs. The
remaining 20 policy areas are also included in
Japan’s FTAs (see Figure 1), but the rules set forth
in the FTAs are much less ambitious than what
the TPP rules are expected to be.
Japan has rarely introduced “comprehensive and
high-standard” rules into its FTAs, nor has it
pushed ambitious rules on its FTA partners. The
reasons are twofold: First, with the sole exception
of an FTA with Switzerland, Japan’s FTAs are
with emerging economies in Asia and Central and
South America. Second, Japan has found it neces-
sary to avoid liberalizing agricultural markets.
Japan’s FTAs include rules on intellectual proper-
ty rights and competition policy, but these rules
do not go beyond existing WTO agreements and
non-binding commitments to “cooperate” and
“endeavor” in these areas.
The high-standard rules of the TPP will not only
go far beyond WTO agreements, they will also
surpass some of Japan’s domestic regulations. As
a result, participating in the TPP adds to the pres-
sure to revise Japan’s internal regulations and
institutions. In the past, trade friction with the
United States resulted in gaiatsu (foreign pressure)
that pushed Japan’s policymakers to change
domestic regulations. The United States’ involve-
ment intensifies skepticism towards the TPP in
Japan. For example, currently, Japan’s copyright
law provides a protection period lasting fifty
years after the death of the copyright holder (sev-
enty years in the case of films). It is possible that
participating in the TPP will require Japan to
lengthen its copyright protection period. In short,
pressures to revise laws to conform with the TPP
mean that this agreement will affect the lives of
Japanese citizens far more than FTAs have.
The Impact of Mega-FTAs on Regional and
Global trading Orders 
The WTO’s Doha round has long been in a mori-
bund state so the nexus of trade and investment
liberalization and rulemaking is now found in the
negotiations over mega-FTAs. Mega-FTAs will
have much greater economic and social impacts
on members (and non-members) than existing
FTAs, and do more to reshape regional and global
trading orders, because of the scale of the
economies involved, the size of their populations,
the number of participating nations, and the
amount of territory they cover.
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Current FTAs Japan and Asia-Pacific nations have
concluded do not adequately address issues aris-
ing from increasing production fragmentation
and transactions among regional companies that
have created cross-border supply chains (value
chains). Some critics argue that these FTAs have
created a confusing “spaghetti bowl” (or “noodle
bowl”) of entangled rules in the Asia-Pacific
region. Mega-FTAs are policy instruments for
dealing with the complications created by bilater-
al FTAs and for handling problems that bilateral
FTAs left unresolved.
In the world today, other mega-FTAs are under
negotiation. For example, in the Asia-Pacific
region, 16 nations are participating in talks
regarding the establishment of a Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In the
West, the United States and the European Union
are working out the details of their Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). How-
ever, it was TPP negotiations that truly kicked off
the mega-FTA era, and the TPP should be credit-
ed with instigating other efforts to create mega-
FTAs (see Figure 2).
TPP talks date back to March 2010, whereas all
other mega-FTA negotiations began in 2013. TPP
talks have also progressed further than negotia-
tions for other mega-FTAs. As noted above, the
TPP is meant to be a “comprehensive, high-stan-
dard, 21st-century FTA” unlike any trade agree-
ment that has come before. If we also consider the
fact that some TPP nations are also negotiating
other mega-FTAs, it seems likely that these sepa-
rate trade talks are in fact interrelated and that the
TPP is serving as a template for other mega-FTAs.
In other mega-FTA talks, the participants can look
at rules drafted by TPP negotiators and may
adapt them to fit their own levels of economic
development. If a rule is included in more than
one mega-FTA, it is possible that rule will go from
being a regional standard, in Asia for example, to
becoming a global standard endorsed by the
WTO.
Japan Shifts to a New FTA Strategy
Japan’s customary approach to FTAs has largely
kept it from experiencing the pain of opening its
agricultural markets and amending domestic reg-
ulations. Similarly, Japan’s FTAs have had limited
impact elsewhere. The TPP, on the other hand, is
an FTA that will cause Japan considerable distress
once it takes effect and will significantly influence
regional and global trading orders. As a result,
while Japan was in the process of deciding
whether to join the TPP talks, it was faced with
the necessity of radically changing its approach to
FTAs. In response to this challenge, Japan’s trade
policies entered a new phase as Japan joins in cre-
ating mega-FTAs that will force Japan to alter its
domestic regulations. Japan is currently involved
in negotiations over four mega-FTAs: the TPP, a
trilateral FTA with China and South Korea, a
Japan-EU FTA, and the RCEP.
Conclusion
The TPP is an FTA that is pushing Japan to
embark on a new trade policy course. Japan’s TPP
negotiation process, however, suggests that the
work of winning domestic acceptance of the TPP
remains incomplete. Nevertheless, Japan holds
the key to whether the TPP process can greatly
liberalize trade and generate comprehensive,
high-standard rules that will be adopted regional-
ly and globally.
If mega-FTAs are interrelated in such a way that
TPP rules can become regionally and then global-
ly accepted as the new rules governing interna-
tional trade, then Japan can play a major part in
that process through the four mega-FTAs that it is
currently negotiating. Through its participation in
the TPP and three other mega-FTAs, Japan can
take credit for leading the effort to create new
rules that will be adopted regionally and around
the world. By opening its markets and carrying
out internal reforms, Japan can become a leader
in the TPP and other mega-FTA negotiations.
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Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is intended to great-
ly liberalize trade by, among other policies, elimi-
nating all tariffs between partner nations. Never-
theless, our legislature, specifically the Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee, is
demanding that Japan be allowed to keep its tar-
iffs on five agricultural products including rice,
wheat, beef, pork, dairy products, and sugar. The
Diet Committee has indicated it would not hesi-
tate to end Japan’s participation in TPP talks if the
other TPP nations refuse to make an exception for
Japanese agriculture. This threat has tied the gov-
ernment’s hands. Despite the fact that the com-
bined value of the yearly output of these protected
products, four trillion yen, is 1/13th the value of
annual automotive production in Japan, agricul-
tural interests are controlling Japan’s TPP agenda.
Japan’s insistence on protecting its agricultural
markets will lead the United States to keep its tar-
iffs on Japanese automobiles for the foreseeable
future. At the same time, the US-Korea Free Trade
Agreement has eliminated US tariffs on Korean
cars. Japan is wasting an opportunity to improve
the conditions of competition for Japanese
automakers in the US market to match that of
their Korean automakers. Moreover, a growing
number of US Congress members are calling for
Japan to be excluded from TPP negotiations
because of its insistence on protecting numerous
agricultural products.
Are High Tariffs in Japan’s National Interests? 
The OECD has devised a measure, the Producer
Support Estimate (PSE), of how much money is
transferred from consumers and taxpayers to
farmers as a result of agricultural protection poli-
cies. For instance, when people must pay more
for a product than the international market price,
the additional amount paid is an income transfer
from consumers to farmers. The PSE consists of
consumers’ burden and taxpayers’ burden. In
2010, the share of consumers’ burden in PSE in
the United States was six percent and that in the
EU was 15 percent, nowhere near that in Japan－
78 percent (approximately 3.6 trillion yen). While
the US and the EU governments provide farmers
with income support through direct payments,
Japan relies primarily on price-support schemes
to protect its farmers. Because the domestic prices
are much higher than international market prices,
it takes high tariffs to bring the price of imports
up to domestic price levels.
In the name of the national interest, the govern-
ment imposes tariffs to maintain high prices for
agricultural products and foods. In the case of
wheat, for example, domestically grown wheat
accounts for only 14 percent of the wheat con-
sumed in Japan. To protect the growers of that 14
percent, tariffs are placed on the other 86 percent
that is imported, forcing consumers to pay inflat-
ed prices for bread, noodles, and other products.
Policymakers are starting to consider lowering
the consumption tax on food because it is a
regressive tax which imposes a heavy burden on
poor people, but politicians continue to claim that
the tariffs that are driving up food prices are serv-
ing the national interest.
Critics of the TPP argue that switching from using
tariffs to bridge the price difference between
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domestic and imported farm products (consumer
financed) to making direct payments to farmers
(taxpayer financed) would require a massive
amount of government spending. This claim can
only be regarded as a frank admission that con-
sumers are already paying a massive amount to
support farmers. Moreover, as in the case of
wheat, consumers are paying inflated prices not
just for domestic products but for imported ones
as well, making their actual burden larger still.
Eliminating tariffs and introducing direct pay-
ments to farmers to compensate for the difference
between prices for domestic and imported prod-
ucts would save consumers a great deal as they
would no longer be forced to pay above interna-
tional market prices for imported as well as
domestic products.
Taxpayers already pay 400 billion yen to rice
farmers annually for setting aside acreage to
reduce production. These set-asides raise the
price of rice, pushing the total burden to con-
sumers above 600 billion yen per year. Japan’s
annual rice production is valued at two trillion
yen. The Japanese people, as taxpayers and con-
sumers, pay a total of one trillion yen each year to
support domestic rice farmers. If the government
abolished the acreage set-aside program, and
instead paid compensation to farmers (whose pri-
mary source of income is farming) if rice prices
subsequently fall, the government would then
need to spend a relatively modest 200 billion yen
to support rice farmers. In addition, consumers
would no longer have to endure prices made arti-
ficially high through the acreage set-aside pro-
gram. The combined cost to taxpayers and con-
sumers would shrink from one trillion yen to 200
billion yen.
The Agricultural Cooperatives and Policies
Obstructing Agricultural Development
In Japan, there is an impediment to changing from
price supports to direct payments that does not
exist in the United States or the European Union—
the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) that
depends heavily on high rice prices. Under the
JA’s rules, the vote of a weekend farmer counts as
much as the vote of a large scale farmer. The “one
person, one vote” system made sense in the early
postwar era, when land reforms aimed at trans-
forming tenant farmers in each village into owners
of simillary-sized plots of land. The JA helps to
turn out the rural vote for the Liberal Democratic
Party which repays the favor with rice price sup-
ports and various subsidies.
Income is revenue, which is price multiplied by
quantity minus costs. Increasing income requires
Figure 1: Comparison of the effects of wheat price supports and direct payments
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either raising prices, raising yields, or lowering
costs. In the past, when the government bought
rice under the “food control system,” the JA mobi-
lized its members in a major campaign to increase
rice prices. In 1995, the food control system was
abolished. The government today only buys small
quantities of rice to keep in case of emergency. The
JA has worked to keep prices high by limiting the
supply of rice by taking land out of production
under acreage set-aside programs.
The unit cost of growing rice on a 15 hectare farm
is less than half what it costs to grow rice on a .5
hectare farm. The unit cost of growing rice on a
given farm is calculated by dividing the total cost
of inputs, such as fertilizer, agrochemicals, and
machinery, by the yields. If the yield doubles, the
unit cost is halved. In other words, farmers can
increase their incomes without raising prices
through economies of scale and higher yields. Peo-
ple who farm part-time, or as pensioners, with
farms smaller than one hectare earn practically
nothing from farming. However, if a group of vil-
lagers owned a total of 20 hectares and delegated
all the cultivation to one person, the annual income
from the resulting crop would be 14.5 million yen.
It would be more lucrative for villagers to jointly
lease their land in return for a share of the lessee’s
income than for each family to farm its own land.
Increasing the average farm size would of course
mean a reduction in the number of farm house-
holds given that the amount of land is essentially
fixed. The JA is well aware that its political clout is
dependent on the number of farmers it represents
and has no interest in seeing that number fall. The
JA therefore demanded price supports for rice and
opposed fundamental agricultural reform and
rationalization as a means to increasing its mem-
bers’ income. As the JA had envisioned, high rice
prices motivated part-time farmers to continue
growing rice inefficiently in their tiny plots and to
avoid relinquishing their property.
Part-time rice growers, who now account for 70
percent of all farm households, tend to deposit
their earned income and gains from sales of their
land for residential use and other non-farming
uses in banks run by the JA. With 90 trillion yen
in deposits, the JA bank is one of the leading
megabanks in Japan.
People who wanted to grow rice on a larger scale
to increase their income struggled to buy or lease
enough land to farm efficiently. Evidence of the
distorting effects of high rice price supports can
be found in the percentages of farm products that
are sold by full-time farmers; 80 percent of veg-
etables, 93 percent of dairy products, but only 38
percent of rice is produced by full-time farmers.
Rice acreage set-aside programs have also imped-
ed advances in crop yields. If overall consump-
tion levels are fixed, increasing yields means that
fewer acres of rice paddy are needed, which
increases the acreage eligible for set-aside pro-
grams and the amount the government pays to
farmers for taking their land out of production.
As a result, after the set-aside program was intro-
duced in 1970, government-affiliated research
institutions regarded developing higher yield
strains of rice as taboo. The rice grown in Japan
has 40 percent lower yields than rice grown in
California. A private company has developed a
variety of rice with yields higher than California
rice, but the fear of larger rice harvests driving
prices down has kept the JA from accepting it.
The high price supports for rice and the set-aside
programs have cut rice consumption and produc-
tion. The total value of rice grown in Japan fell by
half over 10 years. Without tariffs, it would be
impossible to continue the set-aside program that
keeps the price of domestic rice higher than
imported rice. If the government used direct pay-
ments to aid farmers, they would be unaffected
by price declines. However, getting rid of tariffs
would effectively end part-time farming as larger
scale farms gain the advantages of scale. Ending
part-time farming would lead to a steep loss of
members for the JA that would shake the organi-
zation to its core. This is why the JA has orga-
nized an extensive campaign against the TPP. The
JA extracts promises from rural Diet members to
oppose joining the TPP and abolishing agricultur-
al tariffs as conditions for receiving the JA’s help
in getting elected. Instead of the trade agreement
controversy being a “TPP-agriculture problem,”
in reality it is a “TPP-JA problem.”
Why Japanese Agriculture Needs the TPP
The farm lobby in Japan argues that Japan’s farms
are too small to compete with the farms of the
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United States and Australia. The average farm in
the EU is six times larger than in Japan. Average
farms in the US and Australia farms are 75 and
1,309 times bigger, respectively.
Larger scale usually means lower costs, but size is
not the only factor. If that were the case, then the
US, the world’s leading agricultural exporter,
would be unable to compete with Australia given
that its farms are 17 times larger than American
farms. In reality, factors such as soil quality and
climate outweigh Australia’s farm size advantage.
Whereas fertile soil in the US will support soy-
bean and corn farming, Australia’s less fertile
land is better suited to livestock grazing. The fact
that Australian wheat farmers grow only 1/5th as
much wheat per acre as their UK counterparts
testifies to the poor quality of Australian soil. EU
farms are drastically smaller than farms in the US
and Australia (1/12th and 1/218th, respectively),
but due to high crop yields and direct payments
from the EU, the EU agricultural industry is able
to export grain.
There is also the issue of quality. As in the case of
automobiles, there is demand for luxury products
as well as cheap products in the global agricultur-
al market. A given farm product can be available
in a wide range of quality levels. Rice grown in
Japan has a reputation for high quality. In Hong
Kong, koshihikari rice from Japan sells at a price
1.6 times higher than koshihikari grown in Califor-
nia and 2.5 times higher than koshihikari from
China. If Japan’s rice production rose to the point
where it could be priced competitively, Japan’s
farmers could capitalize on their widely recog-
nized quality advantage.
Japan’s domestic rice market, long protected by
high tariffs, is now contracting as the population
ages and declines. To keep Japanese agriculture
from falling further or, more ambitiously, to
revive it, there is no choice but to break into over-
seas markets. Bringing down costs will not lead to
higher sales if Japan’s farm exports are subject to
high tariffs abroad. If Japan fails to fully commit
to trade liberalization initiatives such as the TPP
that will eliminate tariffs, then Japanese agricul-
ture will be trapped in its downward spiral.
The most promising export market for Japan is of
course China. Currently, China applies a 1 percent
tariff to Japanese rice imports. However, a kilo-
gram of rice that costs 300 yen in Japan is sold for
1300 yen in Shanghai. The beneficiary of this huge
markup is the Chinese state-owned enterprise
(SOE) that has a monopoly on rice distribution.
As long as such de facto tariffs exist, exports will
remain restricted.
Although China is not participating in the TPP
talks, one of the United States’ long-term goals for
the TPP is to use it to pressure China to eliminate
barriers to free trade created by its SOEs. Viet-
nam, another socialist nation with SOEs, is serv-
ing as a stand-in for China in negotiations. If
China were to eventually join the TPP, it would
have to accept the same state-owned enterprise
rules as Vietnam. If Japan were to negotiate
directly with China, it would lack the leverage to
convince the Chinese government to limit its
SOEs’ obstruction of free trade. Japan’s only
option is to work with the United States to devel-
op rules to constrain SOEs. Participating in the
TPP talks gives Japan an opportunity to break
into the Chinese market. 
Conclusion
The development of Japanese agriculture is being
blocked by farm policies such as rice acreage set-
aside programs. However, as long as the JA has
both great political clout and monopolistic market
power, there is no chance that set-aside programs
will be abolished, that other fundamental farm
policy reforms will be enacted, that exports will
increase, or that Japan will really engage in TPP
negotiations. Having identified the TPP as an
important part of its economic growth strategy,
the Abe administration has begun working
toward a systemic reform of the JA, the organiza-
tion which had kept Japan out of the TPP process.
Continuing to use tariffs to keep the price of farm
goods high will further damage Japanese agricul-
ture and hurt consumers. Bold action to reform
agriculture is necessary to ease the burden on
poor people by lowering prices and to revive
farming in Japan. There is no other way to reverse
the decline of Japanese agriculture.
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1. Introduction
As the debate over the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) exemplifies, the questions of with which
nations should Japan enter into free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) and which products should be lib-
eralized under the FTAs have become some of the
most actively discussed topics. However, when a
new FTA is ratified, there is a tendency for the
public and media to immediately shift their atten-
tion to the next FTA negotiations. As a result, con-
cerns over the status of the utilization of existing
FTAs or obstacles to their utilization are often
overlooked, even though the conclusion of FTAs
does not automatically bring economic benefits to
member countries.
For example, no matter how ambitious an FTA is
in liberalizing trade, if potential users, especially
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), face
significant transaction costs in using FTAs, the
number of actual FTA users will not expand. This
paper outlines the obstacles actual and potential
FTA users face and discusses domestic policy
measures needed to further promote FTA utiliza-
tion in Japan.
2. Recent Trends in Utilization of FTAs in Japan
The number of the issuance of certificates of ori-
gin, which are necessary when exporting goods to
FTA partner countries, increased by more than
four-fold over the past five years, between Janu-
ary 2009 and January 2014, from 3,373 to 14,892.
This upward trend in the number of certificates of
origin indicates that the exporting of products
under the FTA preferential tariffs is steadily
growing. However, annual surveys conducted by
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
suggest that the utilization ratio of FTAs in terms
of the number of firms benefitting from preferen-
tial tariffs is growing much more slowly. In 2009,
36.2 percent of companies exporting to FTA part-
ners utilized FTA preferential tariffs. By 2013, that
percentage had grown to 42.9 percent, an increase
of only 6.7 percentage points, suggesting that
there still remains room to expand the number of
users.
There are several reasons why an exporter may
not utilize FTA preferential tariffs when exporting
to a partner country even after an FTA has been
concluded. First, there is no need for the exporter
to utilize preferential tariffs, if past GATT/WTO
negotiations have already eliminated the most-
favored nation (MFN) tariffs on items being trad-
ed. Second, FTAs do not necessarily ensure a
completely free trade environment. FTA member
countries can partially or completely maintain
their tariffs on certain products under the FTAs.
Third, an exporter may face prohibitively high
compliance costs associated with restrictive rules
of origin (ROOs) requirement. In such a case, the
exporter may decide not to utilize FTA preferen-
tial tariffs even if the tariffs have been completely
eliminated. Finally, an exporter may face signifi-
cant transaction costs, including information
search costs, in determining whether to utilize an
FTA or when actually utilizing it. For example,
potential FTA users must research and fully
understand information about the tariff-saving
effects of using preferential tariffs, as well as
information about other administrative proce-
dures involved in utilizing the FTA. These trans-
action costs, which have received little attention
Beyond TPP Negotiation: Policy Proposals for
Promoting FTA Utilization
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to date, are discussed in more detail below.
3. Examples of FTA Transaction Costs
The first difficulty for potential FTA users is to
correctly identify the classification numbers (Har-
monised System codes) for their products to be
traded. Exporters cannot realize how beneficial
FTAs will be without accurately estimating the
possible tariff-saving effects of using preferential
tariffs. However, knowing how much will be
saved on tariffs requires correctly identifying HS
codes and the respective preferential tariff rates
applied to the products in question. Although the
first six digits of the HS codes are assigned
according to international standards, from the
seventh digit on, each country can independently
determine the number of digits and numbers
assigned. As a result, exporters trying to use pref-
erential tariffs must first determine the HS codes
assigned by each partner country and apply to
the partners’ customs authorities to get approval
to export under the preferential tariff rates.
If the customs authority of an importing country
disagrees with the HS code that an exporter has
declared, problems may arise as the authority
may refuse to apply the preferential tariff rate to
the exporter’s products at the point of entry. One
way to avoid such problems is to make use of the
importing country’s “advance rulings system,”
but insufficient human resources and poor over-
seas networks make it challenging especially for
SMEs to make full use of such foreign administra-
tive procedures.
The next challenge faced by potential FTA users is
to identify the preferential tariff rates applied to
the products to be traded. In making a manage-
ment decision, a company executive needs to con-
sider not only the preferential tariff rates applied
in the current year, but also how FTA tariffs will
dynamically change during the phase-out period.
It may seem like a simple task at first glance, but
the Japanese customs office only provides infor-
mation on Japan’s preferential tariff rates, not
those of partner countries. Finding foreign tariff
information requires obtaining information
released by foreign governments, foreign data-
base providers, or looking through abstruse
wording of trade agreements. Again, it is not easi-
ly accessible to a company’s staff lacking suffi-
cient English skills.
Trade between two nations may be covered by
multiple FTAs. For example, if the TPP and the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) are both enacted in the near future, com-
panies seeking to export to Malaysia will have the
option of exporting their products under either of
those agreements or the Japan-Malaysia Econom-
ic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA), the ASEAN-
Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(AJCEP), or the most-favored nations (MFN) tar-
iffs under the WTO. In such cases, exporters must
compare the agreements to see which one could
bring about the largest tariff saving effects, as
preferential tariff rates may differ by FTA or by
year even for the same product.
Moreover, if an exporter has production facilities
in multiple countries, the goods produced there
may be eligible for trade agreements among
third-countries such as the ASEAN-China Free
Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the ASEAN-India
Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA). As the number of
trade agreement options increases, so does the
difficulty of identifying the best option for an
exporter.
The fourth difficulty for potential users is to fully
understand ROOs. Companies must obtain a cer-
tificate of origin showing that their products satis-
fy the ROOs stipulated in the FTA and then sub-
mit those documents to customs authorities in an
importing county. Requirements and procedures
of ROOs, however, may vary across partners,
products, and FTAs, and fully understanding
them is again far from easy for companies with
limited human resources.
4. Policy Implications for Further Promoting
FTA Utilization in Japan
Further promoting FTA utilization requires not
only diplomatic efforts to win significant market
access abroad during the negotiation phase, but
also domestic policy efforts to reduce transaction
costs faced by potential users after the negotiation.
This section discusses some policy implications
for further expanding the use of FTAs in Japan.
First, although multiple government agencies are
currently providing significant amounts of FTA-
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related information, it sometimes overlaps across
the agencies. In order to create a more user-
friendly information-gathering environment, a
one-stop portal site, where potential FTA users
can gather all relevant information in one place,
should be provided. Second, the portal site
should also provide a searchable database, in the
Japanese language, that will match product
names or keywords with the HS codes, preferen-
tial tariff rates, and ROO provisions by FTA and
year. From a management strategy perspective,
the most needed information for decision makers
is not a list of tariff rates, but rather information
about tariff savings: how much in tariffs will be
saved, when, and through the use of which FTAs.
Adding a user-friendly tariff saving calculator to
the above-mentioned portal site would be an
effective way to show potential FTA users the
benefits of FTA utilization.
Third, when customs paperwork is handled elec-
tronically, the customs office can take advantage
of that process by providing an automatic alert
system that informs exporters if their products
are eligible for preferential FTA tariffs and how
much money they would save by using them.
South Korea has already introduced an “automat-
ic notification of FTA preference” system to its
customs process.
Finally, success stories and case studies telling
how other companies in similar industries have
utilized FTAs successfully could be another valu-
able form of information for potential users.
These stories and studies can also be provided
through the FTA portal site.
The benefits of promoting FTA utilization
through such domestic measures go beyond
securing short-term economic gains from FTA’s
trade expansion effects. Increasing the number of
FTA beneficiaries can be expected to have the
politico-economic effect of further expanding and
strengthening the domestic base of support for
future trade policy, including regional economic
integration and trade liberalization.
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When companies provide work-life balance sup-
port for employees with children, they help both
male and female workers fulfill their roles as par-
ents. Support for employees with elderly parents
is different because the employees are often not
the primary caregivers. Work-life balance support
for workers with aging parents involves helping
employees access essential elder care services that
enable the employees to keep their jobs. The chief
way that companies can help these workers is by
helping them to manage the dual demands of
working and caregiving. Employees are, of
course, not completely uninvolved in direct care-
giving, but there is no way to predict how long
parents will need care. Moreover, the average is
four to five years. Given this length of time, it is
clearly difficult for employees who are primary
caregivers to continue working.
The employees who are most likely to confront
the challenge of working while caregiving are
those over age 45, especially those who are 50 or
older. Today, men outnumber women among
employees over 45, and many of these men have
led work-centered lives or, if they have children,
largely left parenting to their spouses. As a result,
even after a family member begins to require care,
many men assume they will not be obliged to
provide care themselves. Therefore, the first step
in helping employees manage their caregiving
role is to explain the unavoidability of that role.
Providing basic information in advance is the key
to helping employees balance work with caregiv-
ing. The timing is important. If a company waits
to give employees information on maternity leave
and childcare leave until those employees
announce they are expecting a child, it is not too
late. In the case of elder care, however, failing to
provide information on work-life balance with
caregiving ahead of time often has negative con-
sequences.
What employees need to know in advance are not
the particulars of managing elder care while
working. Instead, they require general informa-
tion that will help them to mentally prepare and
accept that caregiving is something they are likely
to undertake at some point. Such basic prepara-
tion will help employees keep their bearings
when the need for caregiving arises. Because peo-
ple who require care have particular, diverse, and
evolving needs, it is better to delay giving
employees detailed information until their own
parents begin to require care.
To guide employees toward accepting that they
will be caregivers at some point in their careers,
companies should make the following four points.
First, anyone with parents may be called upon to
provide care. Second, when that day comes,
employees should consult with their HR depart-
ment and managers on how to access services and
meet the demands of work while caregiving
Supporting Working while Caregiving: New Issues
in Work-life Balance
SATO Hiroki
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rather than trying to develop a plan on their own.
HR departments and managers cannot help
employees meet their caregiving obligations if
they are not told those obligations have arisen.
Third, workers should be encouraged to make
remaining employed a given in all of their deci-
sions about caregiving. Instead of giving up their
jobs to become primary caregivers, employees
ought to find a way to manage the demands of
work and caregiving. Finally, companies should
inform employees that the keys to managing these
demands and keeping their jobs are accessing
caregiving services through the long-term care
insurance system, taking advantage of work-life
balance programs offered by their employers, and
consulting with experts on the options available.
Because employees become ever more likely to
face the issue of caregiving starting in their mid-
40s, basic information on their role as caregivers
is best delivered before then. Before they turn 40
would be too soon, because at that age few people
have parents that require care, and therefore it is
highly likely that younger employees would
regard caregiving information as irrelevant. Con-
sequently, the best time to prepare employees for
eventually becoming caregivers may be when
they reach 40 and can more readily grasp the
potential benefits of that preparation.
Also, when employees turn 40, they are required
to join the public long-term care insurance sys-
tem, but they are not given much information
about that system. For example, they will not
receive an insurance card until their 65th birth-
day. As a result, it is not uncommon for employ-
ees to be unaware that they have been enrolled in
the long-term care insurance system. Those who
are aware often have little understanding of how
the insurance works. Therefore, when employees
turn 40, they can benefit from being taught about
the long-term care insurance system at the same
time they are instructed to prepare for becoming
caregivers and introduced to the work-life bal-
ance programs offered by their employers.
Another appropriate time to discuss caregiving
with employees is when they turn 50 as they are
increasingly likely to face the challenges of care-
giving after reaching this milestone. Balancing
work with caregiving remains especially impor-
tant for employees from the age of 50 until they
retire at age 65.
Ideally, these caregiving information sessions,
whether they occur when the employees are 40 or
50, will motivate employees to talk with their par-
ents about their wishes and gain a clear under-
standing of their parents’ health and lifestyles.
Such discussions will help employees to convey
what type of support they need to their managers
and HR departments. People can plan when to
have children, but there is no way to predict
when aging relatives will begin to need care,
although careful monitoring of your parents’
health and activities can indicate whether that
time is coming sooner rather than later.
Ideally, employees will know how their parents
want to be cared for before that need arises. If
companies make their employees aware of the
importance of paying attention to their parents’
health and activities, and encourage them to find
out their parents’ wishes regarding their own
care, that instruction will itself be a significant
contribution to employees’ work-life balance. Par-
ents become eligible for long-term care benefits
when they turn 65. Employees should be ready to
explain those benefits to their parents as that date
approaches and consult with them about their
wishes regarding care. Because people are more
likely to need help with daily activities and nurs-
ing care after they turn 75, companies should
make an effort to remind employees with parents
75 and older of the increasing importance of
watching for changes in their parents’ needs and
adjusting their care arrangements accordingly.
Companies can provide employees with aging par-
ents work-life balance support when they must
take on the caregiver role by helping them to plan
and to understand and access long-term care insur-
ance, professional care providers, and the compa-
nies’ own work-life balance programs. Family care
leave is the core of most companies’ work-life bal-
ance programs, but many employees mistakenly
believe that care leave can only be taken if they are
personally providing care. Teaching employees
that care leave can be used to arrange for care,
meet with nursing and personal care providers, or
visit their parents is another valuable way for com-
panies to support their employees.
Page 30 Social Science Japan March 2015
ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute
of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
ISS Contemporary Japan Group seminar series provides English-speaking residents of the Tokyo area with an
opportunity to hear cutting-edge research in social science and related policy issues, as well as a venue for
researchers and professionals in or visiting Tokyo to present and receive knowledgeable feedback on their latest
research projects. Seminars are open to everyone. Admission is free and advance registration is not required.
For further information, please consult the CJG website: http://web.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cjg/.
Glenda S. Roberts
(Professor at Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda
University)
September 30, 2014
Imagining and Living the Family: Attitudes from Young-ish Adults in
Urban Japan
In recent decades, Japan has become a rapidly aging, low birthrate society.
Late marriage and no marriage have also become commonplace. With the
prolonged recession, stable, regular employment declined, wages declined, and the prototypical ‘salaryman’
male of the postwar period took a beating. In this milieu, how do young adults feel about gender roles in
marriage? Have attitudes changed in regard to co-habitation, marriage and childrearing, and if so, how?
How do the unmarried imagine themselves in the future, and how do the married wish to rear their
children? The data from this work in progress come from a qualitative survey of sixteen adults ages 23-39, as
part of a larger survey research project of the East-West Center’s Population and Health Research Program
on Family Change in Asia.
Kent Calder
(Director and Professor of Japan Studies, Director of Edwin O.
Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,)
November 4, 2014
Asia in Washington: Socio-political Transformation in America’s Capital
City and Implications for Japan
How has the socio-political context of policymaking in Washington, D.C.
changed since the end of the Cold War, as Washington has emerged as a "global political city" with research
and agenda-setting functions far transcending US government decision-making? How have Asian
countries—particularly the Northeast Asian powerhouses Japan, China, and Korea— established, increased,
and leveraged their Washington influence in this new environment? And what impact will these countries
have on the decisions made in the halls of power in Washington?
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Abenomics’ “Critical Moment”: Stalled? Backfiring? Or Poised for
Takeoff?
After Bank of Japan Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda jolted global markets with his
Halloween surprise stimulus, he said the bold Abenomics bid to end the
country's long slump had reached a "critical moment." When Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe launched his program in late 2012, it was greeted with widespread enthusiasm and support from
voters, economists, investors, executives, and consumers. Now they're having second thoughts. Mr. Abe's
poll numbers are falling, as households say they're feeling more pain than gain. Mr. Kuroda's own policy
board is split, his latest move approved by a bare 5-4 majority secured only at the last minute. Are these the
inevitable pains of a recovering economy in transition? Or the signs of yet another Japanese growth plan
fizzling out? Or, worse, the beginning of the economic collapse predicted by the Abenomics' harshest critics?
A journalist's layperson-friendly dissection of where Japan's economy has been the past two years, and where
it's heading－including a handicapping of big decisions looming, on taxes and structural reforms.
Mary M. McCarthy
(Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Drake
University)
December 17, 2014
How American Legislators Came to Befriend the “Comfort Women” and
Shake Up U.S.-Japan Relations
The U.S.-Japan relationship is being tested by the resurgence of history
issues, and contending interpretations of the past and the meaning it holds
today. In this project, I explore two crucial case studies: passage of U.S.
House Resolution 121, which called on Japan to acknowledge and apologize for the use of “comfort women,”
or sexual slaves during WWII, and the erection of “comfort women” memorials throughout the U.S. My
thesis is that processes of identity formation (at the individual, group, and national levels) have combined
with domestic political dynamics to put the U.S. and Japanese governments at odds. My analysis explores
how contemporary understandings were born and evolved and uncovers how these differing interpretations
resulted in actions and reactions by the American and Japanese governments.
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ISS Contemporary Japan Group at the Institute
of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
ISS Contemporary Japan Group seminar series provides English-speaking residents of the Tokyo area with an
opportunity to hear cutting-edge research in social science and related policy issues, as well as a venue for
researchers and professionals in or visiting Tokyo to present and receive knowledgeable feedback on their latest
research projects. Seminars are open to everyone. Admission is free and advance registration is not required.
For further information, please consult the CJG website: http://web.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cjg/.
Brian Woodall
(Associate Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)
January 22, 2015
The Development of Japan’s Developmental State: Stages of
Growth and the Social Costs of Energy Policies
Why is it that the Fukushima nuclear crisis has not dictated a
fundamental overhaul of Japan’s energy strategy, especially when it
comes to the role accorded nuclear energy? Indeed, changes to date
have been mostly incremental, and the current Abe Government is
intent on restarting the country’s nuclear reactors at the earliest possible date. A central finding of this
research is that much of what is puzzling about Japanese energy policymaking derives from institutional
hangover, structural rigidities, and path dependence that are by-products of a “developmental state”
approach to industrialization. By focusing on the dynamic tension embodied in the environmental/social
costs of energy policy choices, it is possible to discern tipping points in the evolution of Japan’s
developmental state. Over the course of the postwar period, this evolution has unfolded through four stages:
1) erecting the institutional scaffolding for strategic growth (1945-1954); 2) export-led industrialization (1955-
1970); 3) deceleration and liberalization (1971-1989); and 4) sustainable globalization (1990 to present).
Similarities in institutional responses at comparable levels of advancement suggest that the South Korean and
Chinese developmental states are evolving through broadly comparable stages. Understanding the
development of the East Asian developmental state – whose archetype was “made in Japan” – bears
important implications for understanding the forces of institutional change in a dynamic and important
region in the world political economy.
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Nemoto Kuniaki
(Professor in the Organization for Japan-US Studies, Waseda
University)
January 28, 2015
Parliamentary Activities, Cabinet Appointment, and Responsible
Party Government: Evidence from Japan
Which members of parliament actively engage in parliamentary
activities, specifically through the initiation of private member's
bills (PMBs), and how do these activities affect the functioning of
the Japanese legislature? An increase in the number of PMBs, I
argue, reflects the rise of responsible party government, whereby parties compete by offering policy
platforms and appealing to voters through policymaking credentials and responsiveness. In exchange for
policy loyalty and contributions to the party label, party leaders provide backbenchers with selective
benefits, such as cabinet positions. However, this positive cycle only exists where voters rely on a party's
collective reputation in making voting decisions. I use the case of Japan to test empirically the implications
of this model.
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Recent Publications by ISS and ISS Staff
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Recent Publications by ISS and ISS Staff
*For more publications, please visit the ISS Homepage (http://jww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/, http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/).
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Institute of Social Science Library
ISHIKAWA Maki and MITANI Meiko
In two previous issues of the SSJ Newsletter, the Institute of Social Science Library at the University of Tokyo intro-
duced special collections related to Japan’s labor history and Asia nations. In this third installment, the ISS Library
introduces collections related to Manchuria and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
Shimada Archives
This collection of materials related to the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, Sixth Section (China Intelligence) was
once owned and collected by Professor Shimada Toshihiko (1908-1975), a historian of Japan-China relations. The family
of Professor Shimada donated the materials to the ISS, which was soliciting materials for the cross-disciplinary ISS
research project “Fascism and Democracy.”
The collection is comprised of government documents on China, mostly from 1932 to 1940, extending from the Shang-
hai Incident into the Second Sino-Japanese War. A considerable number of these documents have been published in the
series ‘現代史資料’ Gendaishi shiryō (Contemporary History Documents) by Misuzu Shobō, the publisher, specifically in
the volumes titled ‘満州事変’ Manshū jihen (Manchurian Incident), ‘続・満州事変’ Zoku Manshū jihen (Manchurian Inci-
dent, part 2), and ‘日中戦争’ Nitchū sensō (the Second Sino-Japanese War). In addition, the collection includes 74 books
that Professor Shimada acquired while researching the Manchurian Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese war. The
Shimada Archives, except for the books, have been transferred to microfilm.
The Collection of Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
The Collection of Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East is a series of 858 volumes (in 860 books) of
unpublished official documents. The series is divided into nine categories, including the Proceedings of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Okano Kanki Collection described below.
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Among the aforementioned documents from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East are court transcripts,
documentary evidence from the prosecution and the defense, trial-related materials,
defense-related materials, catalog, and indexes. In 1966, the ISS purchased the papers of
Kanase Kunji, the lead defense attorney for Hashimoto Kingorō. In 1971, the ISS received
documents from Sammonji Shōhei, lead defense attorney for Koiso Kuniaki, as well as
copies of trial-related materials from the Ministry of Justice, Asahi Shimbun, and the Wase-
da University Library. Some documents that were rejected by the tribunal and original
materials used by the defense in preparing for trial are also included.
Okano Kanki Collection
The collection of “Far East-related documents” is composed of 331 volumes of the-858-volume Collection of Records of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Amongst these are 38 files related to the Kwantung Army and Manchuria
collected by Okano Kanki (1896-1977), who had been seconded to the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army. These
files include many documents from 1938-1940 that show how the Kwantung Army actually conducted its “internal
guidance” (内面指導 naimen shidō) on economic affairs in Manchuria.
Sogō Shinji Collection
The collection once belonged to Sogō Shinji (1884-1981), former president of the Japan National Railway, pertaining to
the South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu). Mr. Sogō was on Mantetsu’s board of directors and served as
chair of its Economic Research Committee (満鉄経済調査会 Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai). This committee played an impor-
tant role in policymaking at the time the state of Manchukuo was created.
This collection features books, documents, and periodicals focused on Mantetsu that Mr. Sogō acquired while working
for the corporation. In 1947, the donation of these items to ISS resulted from the efforts of ISS professors and Nambara
Shigeru, professor and president of the University of Tokyo at the time. In fact, the first Japanese and foreign language
books of the ISS Library were from the Sogō Shinji Collection, our founding collection.
How to use the collections
To access these collections, patrons must submit a ‘request to use special collections’ to obtain a permit from the library
in advance. Please consult the library for more information on how to use the materials: counter@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp. Our
website is http://library.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index_e.html.
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